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Abstract This article compiles an expose of Valentino Bra-
itenberg’s singular view on neuroanatomy and neuroscience.
The review emphasizes his topologically informed work on
neuroanatomy and his dialectics of brain-based explanations
of motor behavior. Some of his early ideas on topologically
informed neuroanatomy are presented, together with some of
his more obscure work on the taxonomy of neural fiber bun-
dles and synaptic arborizations. His functionally informed
interpretations of neuroanatomy of the cerebellum, cortex,
and hippocampus, are introduced. Finally, we will touch on
his philosophical views and the inextricable role of function
in the explanation of neural behavior.
Keywords Neuroscience · Neuroanatomy · History ·
Braitenberg · Behavioral function
1 Prolegomena
Above great achievements, what brings the community to
admire a scientist is a set of characteristics that transcend
science and knowledge and approach nobility and wisdom.
Science is a human endeavor with the commendable goal of
understanding reality, in the hope that advancing science will
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bring us to better understand ourselves, and ourselves in the
world. Through the work of great men, we approach that ideal.
In great minds, tenacity is augmented by the ability to
channel the product of observations with clarity and flair. In
their descriptions the reality beneath the experiment becomes
alive, unencumbered by jargon, wants to speak itself. The
constraints imposed by experiment rather than nuisances,
appear as scaffolds. For them, nature both suggests and takes
precedence over theoretical constructs. As a consequence,
their prose often reads as if it would have written itself, as if
truth yearned for light.
This article was conceived before the passing of Valentino
Braitenberg, in the hope that he would have the opportunity
to personally review it. Due to that it will likely at times read
as an eulogy, but in that case, I believe, excusably. Braiten-
berg was a model of scientific attitude, both sober and jovial,
inspired and humble, strict, and flexible. Simultaneously able
to capture the essentials in an effortless glance, while swiftly
accepting the burden of proof. With clarity, he indicated the
flimsy, the flaky, the incomplete, the obscure, the messy, the
missing, meanwhile stressing the necessary, the inescapable,
the solid. Sternly, he offered pondered and polished logical
foundations of his beliefs.
The article attempts to characterize Valentino’s manner
of doing neuroanatomy and neuroscience while enlisting
some of his most significant contributions to theory, method,
and philosophy of the functional interpretation of neuroanat-
omy.
With the hope of becoming great, we attempt to mirror
ourselves against models. In neuroscience we have great
men to mirror ourselves against. Cajal, Sherrington, Varel-
a, Bernstein, von Helmholz, Reichardt, and now Braiten-
berg. Valentino Braitenberg was a living influence on many,
and his legacy will be there for many to discover and learn
from.
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2 Introduction
During his six decades of nonstop scientific activity, Val-
entino Braitenberg spanned broad contributions to neuro-
science opening vast vistas from the standpoint of neuro-
anatomy. Meticulous, thorough, systematic, and insightful,
he furthered staining methods, proposed correction meth-
ods for tissue shrinkage, contributed to our understanding of
schizophrenia, exposed the computations of myelin bundles,
theorized about information and control, advanced our under-
standing of the hippocampal anatomy, described, quantified,
and interpreted the architecture of the cerebral and cerebel-
lar cortex, provided the most comprehensive quantification
of the mouse cortex to date, and if that were not enough,
invented robot psychology.
This article compiles an expose of Braitenberg’s singu-
lar view on neuroanatomy and neuroscience. We illustrate
his abilities as a scientific diagrammer, as a taxonomist
of connectivities, and his functionally informed interpreta-
tions of neuroanatomy of the cerebellum, the cortex, and
the hippocampus. Excursi on the philosophy behind his
observations and opinions will be interspersed within the
text. Because of his towering output, this review will, per-
force, have exclusions. Notably, only passing mentions of
his contributions to insect neuroethology, his deep insights
into theories of cortical function, his theory of language,
and the lauded book “Vehicles” (Braitenberg 1984). These
are left for the reader to discover. The review empha-
sizes his topologically informed work on neuroanatomy
and his dialectics of brain-based explanations of motor
behavior.
3 The primacy of neuroanatomy
Lest his readership should forget, throughout his publications
Braitenberg indefatigably reinstated that neuroarchitecture is
the grounding for the understanding of the brain. As he put
it, “Neuroanatomy is what is left when all the problems of
the neuron are solved” (Braitenberg 1959). Though prima
facie few would disagree, there are significant variations in
the different approaches on how to proceed with an interpre-
tation of neuroanatomy. Braitenberg’s unique take involved
making sense of the duals of constancy and variability by
localizing invariances and necessities, those aspects of the
phenomenon that remained unchanged with respect to par-
ticular transformations, and then relating them to behavioral
and organismic function.
Braitenberg was perhaps the first neuroanatomist to adopt
concepts of topology as a tool to describe and understand
neuroanatomy (Braitenberg and Kemali 1970; Braitenberg
1977, 1999, 1991). The vocabulary of topology provided him
with conceptual scalpels to effectively describe differences
in neuroarchitecture. Through the sibling concepts of sym-
metry and invariance, his descriptions obtained a degree of
clarity unusual for statements about neuroanatomy. With the
set of topological transformations Braitenberg classified the
cortices. The cortex has rotational invariance, i.e., slices in
any vertical plane rotated in any angle are indistinguishable,
and translational invariance in the two tangential directions
(locally). The hippocampus is a 2D sheet, with translational
invariance in one direction (along the Schaffer collateral
pathway), and hence, no rotational invariance, i.e., slices in
different orientations can be distinguished by whether they
are along the pathway or severing it. The cerebellum has no
rotational invariance, but has two mirror symmetries, along
the parallel fibers, and perpendicular to them. Furthermore,
because the pattern between Purkinje cells and parallel fibers
is repeated along the direction perpendicular to the parallel
fibers, the cerebellar cortex is essentially one-dimensional.
Not limited to vertebrates, analysis of symmetries includes
other arrangements, such as the periodic patterns of the ret-
ina and lamina, which imply a rotational group with exactly
six symmetries. Symmetry features are rich with meaning,
and in a later section some paragraphs will be devoted to
his inspired suggestions. With such descriptions, it becomes
possible to identify subtle differences [for instance, that the
hippocampus does not look all that different from the cor-
tex (Braitenberg and Schüz 1983)], and to give discerning
criteria between brain organs. Also the appearance of par-
ticular symmetries, such as columns in the visual cortex
(Braitenberg and Braitenberg 1979) or the barrel cortex of
rodents, can be explained with relation to behavior (Braiten-
berg 1977).
Through the lenses of topology, the distinctions between
cortical areas are amplified, and the need of explanation for
these disparities highlighted.
Some Symmetry Types (from Braitenberg 1999):
Isotropic networks, with full symmetry (locally).
Examples are the amigdala or the caudate nucleus,
which are invariant to both translations and rotations.
Many subcortical structures are locally isotropic.
Rotationally invariant are the networks that have
one preferential direction in which neuronal
components are stratified and oriented, as the layers
of the cerebral cortex, the optic tectum, or the
dentate nucleus of the cerebellum.
Flip symmetry, with two clearly defined directions at
right angles to each other—along the third axis the
structure repeats homogeneously. E.g.,
hippocampus, where perpendicular direction dentate
gyrus–subiculum, also well defined by the course of
hippocampal mossy fibers and schaffer collaterals.
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Lattice, with mirror symmetries and translational
invariance as in the cerebellum. Translatory
symmetry in one direction, as in the spinal cord.
Periodic, with discrete translatory symmetry, such as
in the periodic ganglia of some insects [e.g., the
Lamina of the fly, the central complex of
sophisticated insects (Strausfeld et al. 1998;
Strausfeld 2009)].
3.1 Topological unfoldings
Having the brain in the mind’s eye can be a daunting task.
Even from experts we often get the impression that the brain
is a twine knot impossible to untangle. For instance, the basal
ganglia or the thalamus seem to be connected to everywhere,
and that is often as much anatomy as many neuroscientists
will allow. But generalized characterizations of connectivity
fail to convey that the namespace anatomists use, relies on,
and maps onto, very particular arrangements between brain
organs. This is where Braitenberg’s understanding of topol-
ogy has provided more than one of us with mental pictures
which allow the mind to grasp many brain areas simulta-
neously, in relation to each other, as if one had personally
performed the dissections. These pictures are ripe with devel-
opmental, organismic and evolutionary hypotheses about the
relationships between neuroanatomy and behavior.
Braitenberg had pictures of the relationships between
brain areas in his mind—pictures that he was able to share
through inspired diagrams. His diagrams of unfolding brains
and brain parts were an essential didactic instrument in
smoothly walking the reader through arguments about infor-
mation flows in the brain.
In what has become a reference work about the neuro-
anatomy of the cerebellum (Braitenberg and Atwood 1958),
he presented it in an intuition defying picture (Fig. 3), elimi-
nating what is perhaps the most conspicuous macroscopic
feature of the cerebellum, its multiple invaginations, the
folia. Not satisfied, he inflated the cerebellum into a balloon,
deliberately ignoring that the unfolded cerebellum is much
longer in the rostro-caudal direction as in the medio-lateral
(Fig. 1; see also Sultan and Braitenberg (1993) for fasci-
nating comparative neuroanatomy). This topological trans-
formation produces a revealing picture which emphasized
continuities and discontinuities in the cerebellar cortex to
great didactical effect. It becomes clear that the cerebellum,
in contrast to the cortex, is continuous in the midline, that
the vermal cortex is mostly disjoint with the hemispheres,
and that the flocculus dangles somewhat isolated from the
cerebellar flanks. Subsequently, focusing on the study of the
foliation, an inspired diagram (Fig. 2) about density of folia
(cerebellar convolutions) reveals subtle and yet regular
asymmetries, further explored in relation to cell counts,
Fig. 1 The thin and long shape of the unfolded human cerebellum
(from Braitenberg and Atwood 1958)
fiber bundles, and layer thicknesses. Aesthetic depictions
like these lend the reader Braitenberg’s eyes, and his in-
text descriptions complement the pictures with suggestive
insights on their hypothetical significance.
No less stunning is his depiction of the unfolding cor-
tical hemisphere of the mouse (Fig. 4b, from Braitenberg
and Schüz 1983), where the cortex and hippocampus exhibit
their natural border, concealed from sight in standard brain
sections, deconvolving the obstacles to the student of neu-
roanatomy, providing a tool for thought (it is endearing that
Braitenberg politely apologizes to the perchance callous neu-
roanatomist, for whom this might have looked trivial, for
this didactic excursus). In the picture, the transition between
the occipital cortex through the entorhinal cortex to the su-
bicculum to the hippocampus, and on to the fascia denta-
ta, becomes obvious (Fig. 4c). The hippocampus appears
as the opposite pole from the olfactory cortex, indicating
its evolutionary origins (Fig. 4a). Complementing this pic-
ture, a second diagram displays clearly the fascia dentata
as a sheet (fascia) enveloping and providing a terminal cap
to the hippocampus. Through this topological picture, inter-
pretation of the involved convolutions of the hippocampus
as they appear in standard sections becomes natural. The
sparse and tridimensional layers of the cortex are progres-
sively squeezed into the subiculum, becoming almost pla-
nar in the hippocampus. The fascia dentata enwraps the thin
edge of the hippocampus. Such visual understanding invites
speculation on the activity fluxes to and fro this flummox-
ing piece of neural machinery. It also invites speculations
relevant to embryogenesis, phylogeny or comparative neu-
roethology (more about this in Sect. 4.4).
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Fig. 2 (original text) Plane representation of the right half of the cere-
bellar cortical sheet. Horizontal parallel lines have the actual measured
length of the folia; three lines represent ten folia. Actual vertical dis-
tances in this representation can be obtained by multiplying number of
horizontal lines by 10 mm (from Braitenberg and Atwood 1958)
Fig. 3 The inflated cerebellum (from Braitenberg and Atwood 1958)
3.2 Meaning in numbers
Alongside with geometry and topology, also numbers are
deconvolved to provide qualitative insight in Braitenberg’s
articles.
Methodically, Braitenberg deployed traditional methods
in neuroanatomy to count neurons, synapses, glia, and fibers.
Facing inadequacies of these methods he furthered them,
introducing alchemic variations of the Golgi, Nissl, and
fiber tract stains, revealing neuroarchitecture at many scales
(Braitenberg 1978; Braitenberg et al. 1967; see also Chapter
3, of Braitenberg and Schüz 1998). From these preparations,
Braitenberg (often assisted by his long-term collaborator
Almut Schüz) painstakingly compiled counts of neurons and
glia, estimates for axonal and dendritic lengths and branch-
ings, volume occupancy of different cortical elements, but-
tonic and synaptic densities. In their 1998 book “Cortex:
statistics and geometry of cortical connectivity”, Braitenberg
and Schüz (1998) present the results of decades of research
in a comprehensive resource of the mouse’s brain, which
provides an extensive compendium of numbers, invaluable
resource for modelers and neuroscience community, an admi-
rable feature of which is the many ways in which estimations
are derived in order to reciprocally verify estimates from
diverse routes (Fig. 5).
The book exemplifies Braitenberg’s take on the meaning
of numbers, offering simple yet compelling explanations for
constancy, variability, and scaling.
Why should the square root of brain weight be propor-
tional to the cubic root of body weight? A clue is given by the
scaling rule of sensory sheets (2D), with brain volume (3D).1
Why should neuronal density be inversely proportional to the
cubic root of brain volume, or why is the cell density smaller
in elephants than in mice? Look at the length of axons con-
necting areas for the answer. Are there interesting exceptions
for scaling rules? Where do they occur? And why? Measure
the different brains and regard the evolutionary ecology of
their owners to look at inter-areal differences.
In my personal experience, it is not uncommon to meet
neuroscientists (especially in the synthetic and computational
side of things) that know no numbers about the brain, but two.
The number of neurons and synapses of the human brain.
Rather than explanatory devices, these two numbers are often
presented to impress the audience (though the impact has
diminished over time). Cell counts, however, become most
useful in the comparative context: how many motor neurons
are there in relation to a particular muscular innervation?
How do cell counts scale with species size, and what is the
relationship to axons and dendrites, and how this relates to
1 Interestingly though, many of his cogent results have remained in rel-
ative obscurity, given the fact that some have attempted to reinvent the
wheel [refs], albeit never with similar clarity.
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Fig. 4 The unfolded
hippocampus (from Braitenberg
and Schüz 1983)
Fig. 5 Summary of measurements, deduced quantities, and derived conclusions (from Braitenberg and Schüz 1998)
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Fig. 6 Map of cortical layers of the mouse cortex. Note the assumed
continuity between outlined areas (from Braitenberg and Schüz 1998)
cross-species scalability? How many neurons are found in
the olfactory cortex, presumably the precursor of the thinking
brain, of different species? Through cunning quantifications,
many such questions admit productive speculation, and to
the extent that knowing such numbers is not sufficient to
understand the brain, without them it becomes an exercise in
arbitrariness.
He shows us that from first principles it is also possible to
derive general statements about the organization of the cor-
tex, and the invariance of certain cell ratios, as for instance,
the relationship between the two-dimensional surface of the
sensory sheets and the three-dimensional volume of the brain.
Braitenberg (2001) shows that modular connectivity is suf-
ficient to explain a number of scaling relationships between
body mass and brain volume, an explanation presaged in his
early paper on the morphology of nerve nets (Braitenberg
1959). Examining the types of connectivity rules that can
exist (all-to-all, local, modular, etc.), and despite idealiza-
tions, the scaling exponent for body mass and brain volume
is revealed from a savory set of simple equations, whose der-
ivation can be understood by anyone with high-school math.
3.3 Cytoarchitectonics
His cytoarchitetonic maps of the mouse cortex are not the
cartographical maps of Broca or Wernicke. Rather, his maps
focus on relevant differences and gradations between them.
Like distinguishing Italians from Austrians, by starting with
the stereotypes. But as in geopolitics of Italy and Austria,
the Alto Adige and the Süd Tirol can be one and the same,
though different, dependent on contextual stance. Much can
be learned from archetypes, and just as much from the grad-
ual miscegenation from one into the other (Fig. 6).
Numbers and cytoarchitectonic maps often have func-
tional concomitants, closely dependent on the ecological
setting and evolutionary history of beings. Through Brai-
tenberg’s lenses, even the deceivingly pedestrian cell counts
teem with meaning. But it is in the functional interpretation
of structures that we find some of his most compelling obser-
vations.
4 Functions of structure
4.1 Structural deficit, functional pathology
It is befitting that one of Braitenberg’s earliest interests was
the neuroanatomy of schizophrenia (Braitenberg 1954), argu-
ably the most peculiar of mental ailments due to its vast and
bewildering symptomatology, in which the subtlest changes
of wiring, eluding even modern day tractography, lead to the
most surreptitious behaviors, implying devious links between
brain structure and cognitive behavior. Ever since his first
article where he, as a young medical doctor, had the opportu-
nity to examine Vogt and Vogt’s collection of schizophrenic
brains, noticing the exquisite subtlety of variations of the
insidious condition, had a keen sense of the tight relationship
between structure and function. That article bespeaks, despite
the immense gaps of knowledge at the time, his penetrating
insights on the minute disparities in cell counts and myel-
o-architectonics, the analysis of which produced ideas made
even more timely by modern advances in measurement, such
as diffusion tensor imaging (DTI). Not long afterwards he
devoted himself to the study of myelo-architectonics and the
functional implications of fiber bundle patterns, summarized
next.
4.2 Connection schemes and myelo-architectonics
For scientists of this materialistic age, it is a truism that func-
tion derives from structure (and the dynamics defined there-
with). The struggle is in inferring the one from the other.
While most would start (and many would remain) in the cor-
tical grey matter, Braitenberg emphasized that much foun-
dational understanding could be obtained by the study of
the, often unsung, white matter bundles. The white and fatty
insulated bundles are formed by axons of neurons as they
traverse between multiple brain areas, in the path to their tar-
gets. Myelinated bundles are more than the source of whale
oil. This intricate set of fibers, whose paths are anything but
arbitrary, can be examined even from macroscopic features
to expose the putative computations performed.
Through visual examination we can determine, for
instance, whether bundles converge or diverge simply by
observing the relative thicknesses of the fiber bundles arriv-
ing and leaving areas. Functionally, a classification machine
able to categorize any spatial pattern would show great
divergence (in recent literature represented sparsity and
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decorrelations (Franzius et al. 2007; Wyss et al. 2003)), while
a device transforming spatio in temporal patterns would show
great convergence [a connectivity pattern that is at the core
of echo-state networks and liquid-state machines (Yamazaki
and Tanaka 2007)]. Should we be amazed that mechanistic
hypotheses can be deduced from macroscopic features of the
brain?
Myelinated fiber bundles originate and project to areas in
a way that, to the chagrin of box diagrams, is exquisitely
heterogeneous. Many of these patterns are distinguishable
with the naked eye, where one is able to identify, with the
help of myelin staining, and more recently with DTI trac-
tography, an assortment of patterns: taperings, commissures,
decussations, chiasms, branchings (Fig. 7). Such visible fea-
tures can be interpreted in terms of the topography of fiber
connections, and Braitenberg, in a paper that could have been
written by a bright undergraduate, catalogued such patterns
showing how the observable features of fiber bundles could
uncover connectivity patterns (Braitenberg 1962).
Further, Braitenberg pointed out that the very mappings
resolved by simple fiber patterns could perform computa-
tions. As it became customary for him, he systematically
enlisted and exemplified patterns, interpreting them in terms
of the computations they could imply. In his manner, and in
interest of completeness, he also added patterns to the list
which do not exist in nature.
In addition to fiber tracts, also the shape of synaptic field
terminations, what is now commonly referred to as arboriza-
tions, can be characterized and taxonomized in classifications
that expose function, or at least nourish speculation. Such
lists help the mind to encircle the spectrum of possibilities,
and from contrasts, to calculate implications.
Taxonomy of synaptic fields
– Fields of excitation nearly coinciding with the pickup field
(granula of the cerebral cortex).
– Far removed from the pickup field as in the giant pyrami-
dal cells (Betz cells) of the cerebral cortex.
– Very dense branching within a narrow region (incoming
sensory fibers in cortex).
– Diffuse branching over large regions (reticulo-cortical
neurons).
– Long straight unbranched and uninsulated (the example
is left as an exercise for the reader. Hint: timing!).
– Chains of separate fields of inhibition (basket cells of the
cerebellar cortex).
– Common shapes are spherical, flat box, or an elongated
pear (most frequent in the cerebral cortex).
In a time where so much knowledge about the brain is given
in conceptually immaterial entities, it is relieving to see that
some entities do indeed exist with palpable counterparts.
What is more, that even macroscopic patterns such as those
of fiber bundles can inform us about the transformations that
neural activity may undergo.
Of the bundle fiber patterns, perhaps the one that has most
occupied his theoretical endeavors were decussations—fiber
crossings that connect non-homologous parts of the brain
(contrast with commissures). His keenness to provide com-
putational interpretations of neuroanatomy is symbolized
by his study of taxis, decussation and kynesis (Braitenberg
1965), an early precursor to the widely acknowledged vehi-
cles (Braitenberg 1984). In it, we find the seed for his take
on the links between structure and function. His suggestions
helped shape a wealth of disciplines, from the interpretation
of neuroanatomy, artificial life and embodied robotics, to
philosophy of mind. Because this is perhaps his best known
work, we shall not be detained here. Suffice it to say that
Braitenberg’s work on the analysis of the white matter should
remind neuroscientists that not all is grey.
4.3 Brain organs
Because functional inferences suggested themselves to Bra-
itenberg, the observation of architectonic peculiarities was
frequently adjoined by a functional hypothesis or cunning
speculation. The following sections feature some selected
examples, on the hippocampus and cerebellum, emphasis,
his and mine, on the latter.
4.4 Hippocampus
Though never having been a primary subject of research,
Braitenberg’s comments on the Hippocampus strike the naive
reader as foundational. This joyful and almost poetic abstract
in one of the few papers published on the topic bespeak a fas-
cination with the topic:
A beautiful appearance under the microscope, a strik-
ing biochemistry, a miraculous electrophysiological
approach as well as a peculiar psychological relevance
make the hippocampus the favorite subject for diverse
groups of enthusiasts. (Braitenberg and Schüz 1983)
As his signature style, Braitenberg compiles a list of the
hippocampus’s unique features, from cytoarchitectonics,
through the unique features of its circuitry, to comparative
neuroanatomy and evolutionary history.
Architectonical comments:
– Only the lower part of the cortex (layer VI) is continuous
with the hippocampus.
– Entorhino-hippocampal pathway is directional, one way,
not matched by a similar on the other direction. His inter-
pretation: igniting of cell assemblies.
– The flow of information (through the perforant fibers,
mossy fibers and Schaffer collaterals) from the upper
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Fig. 7 Some branching
patterns, their potential
functions and some examples
(adapted from Braitenberg
1962)
layers of the entorhinal cortex toward its extended sixth
layer (the subiculum-hippocampus) does not follow the
direction one would expect, but skips to the extreme
ranges of the protruding tongue and then proceeds back-
ward in the direction of the entorhinal cortex.
– System of unidirectional connections in the entorhino-
hipocampal loop (not seen anywhere else in the cortex).
Not numerically prevalent but strong influence from den-
tate to CA3 connections because of their placement on a
crucial part of the dendritic tree.
Evolutionary Comments:
– A criterion for the identification of hippocampi in non-
mammalian brains: where there is no path topologically
identical to the perforant path, there is no hippocampus.
– The hippocampus arose from its output, the olfactory cor-
tex.
– There is no markedly two-dimensional hippocampus in
fishes which live in 3D space. Incidentally, among the
mammals, the dolphin has a surprisingly small hippocam-
pus.
Linking with the results of O’Keefe and Reece (O’Keefe and
Dostrovsky 1971; Jeffery and Burgess 2006) he writes: “A
failure to detect a clear isomorphism between the hippocam-
pus and the external space to which they refer works against
his idea, but such an isomorphism may still be found.” And
indeed it seems to have, as recent experiments evince topo-
logically connected place fields and grid cells, validating his
foresight.
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4.5 Cerebellum and motion
If the hippocampus attracted Braitenberg for its structural
uniqueness, the cerebellum and Braitenberg were predestined
to each other. In no other brain structure does one find such
remarkable symmetries and invariances. Moreover, the organ
of motion has a particular functional relevance for the organ-
ism as, quoth Sherrington, “The only way to do things is by
moving ourselves, the world, or ourselves in relation to it”.
Braitenberg’s life-long fascination with the cerebellum was
never dissociated from the output, motor behavior. From his
early suggestions on to the sophisticated views he sported
more recently, the boundary conditions for his cerebellar the-
ories were always given by the reciprocity between neuro-
anatomy and the physics of movement.
It would be hopeless in this review to encompass the mul-
titudinal character of Braitenberg’s endeavors in the physics
of movement and theories of motor control, but it should be
possible to gist his methods, and enlist some of the most sig-
nificant contributions. The original treaties far surpass any-
thing I can offer, and should I commit any injustice, as an
apology I point to the sources.
In many discussions of cerebellar function, Braitenberg
started by comparing the cerebellum and the cerebral corti-
ces (Braitenberg 2002; Bower 2002; Braitenberg et al. 1997).
Contrasting the cerebellum and the brain may seem ludicrous
at first, but the exercise reveals curious similarities and infor-
mative disparities.
Cerebrum and cerebellum:
– Convergence and Divergence the cerebellum displays
remarkable convergence and divergence (output of the
cerebellum is on the order of 107, same order for the
input). In the telencephalon, the sensory input is on
the order of 106 (from which the visual is the lion’s share),
with the same order for the motor output (pyramidal tract).
The divergence between input and interneurons in both
systems is given by a factor of 104.
– Synapses in the cerebral cortex: 1014 , 104 on the 1010
pyramidal cells and fewer on the stellate cells. Synapses
in cerebellum: a few times 102 on the axons of the 1011
granule cells, a few times 105 on dendrites of 107 purkinje
neurons, 1013 on the other inhibitory cells. Proportion of
synapses on spines: 85 % in cerebellum and 75 % in cere-
bral (some take this as a measure of plasticity).
– Inhibitory Neurons reveal a surprise: percentage of inhib-
itory neurons, in the cerebellum 1 %, in telencephalon
15 %.
– Structural Traits and Symmetries Both are flat, and have
comparable area in humans. The cerebellum is uniform
throughout, with the exception of the floccular cor-
tex. In any small fraction of the cerebellum two direc-
tions are always defined (it is anisotropic, with two flip
symmetries), for every fiber running in the x direction
(along the parallel fibers2) there is one in the −x . Same
is valid for −y. In the cortex, locally, only one direction
is anisotropic (across the layers). In the cerebellum, there
are no cortico-cortico connections in the white substance
underlying the cerebellar cortex. And there are no intrinsic
excitatory fibers. Unlike the cortical input, the two kinds
of input fibers into the cerebellum are radically distinct.
Climbing fibers select individual neurons, mossy fibers
reach extended and overlapping regions. Both are com-
partmentalized, but with distinct symmetries.
From these and other facts, he offers a wealth of deductions
about cerebellar function: basic transformation is the same
in different contexts (motor, vestibular). Input spreads in two
directions, and interactions are local. The principles must be
embodied in a mesh no larger than a few millimeters each
side. Interactions in opposite directions have the same effects.
Climbing fiber reaches the output directly in a point-to-point
fashion. Mossy fibers excite extended, discontinuous patterns
of separate points. Activation of the granule cells in one point
can only produce excitation in a small percentage of cells. Not
a beam (as in Eccles), but tides (i.e., the beam theory could
not work, “if for no other reason but that the term suggests
something strong and inflexible”.3) Braitenberg suggested
’groove’ instead of beam to represent the tidal summation
(Fig. 8). “Parallel fibers acquire their individuality by virtue
of the system of inhibitory fibers arranged at right angles”,
supporting spatio-temporal summation in the parallel fiber
system.
Many of these deductions had been available and known
to cerebellar scientists at the time. Many schemes were pro-
posed to encompass the known anatomy and physiology of
the cerebellum, most famously the “Marr-Albus-Ito” theory
of cerebellar learning. But Braitenberg’s own theory has the
desirable features of respecting anatomy, as it takes up the
challenge of explaining motor control under the assumption
that it has to explain movement as the organism does it, under
the constraints and capabilities with which it is endowed.
2 Despite being a neuroanatomist, Braitenberg suggested that the sys-
tem of coordinates to speak about the cerebellum, instead of the artifi-
cial 3 plane section commonly applied to the cortex, should be given
in the system of coordinates most natural to the orientation of fibers
(x along the parallel fibers, y perpendicular to them, and z, depth).
Recent advances in developmental neuroanatomy, as in the work of the
anatomist Luis Puelles, also suggest coordinate systems more related to
morphogenesis, as the geometry can best be understood in the context
of self-organization of organismic function.
3 Interestingly, many ‘disproving’ arguments against the ‘grooves’ are
directed towards the old ‘beams’.
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Fig. 8 Grooves of excitation
(from Braitenberg 1987)
4.6 Inventing the cerebellum
Cerebellum concerned with movement was established early
in the history of neuroscience with Rolando and Flourens
in the first half of the nineteenth century, as lesions were
reliably associated with ataxias of diverse symptomatology
of disturbances of control, sequencing, and coordination of
movement. Braitenberg’s ideas on the topic were scattered in
his scientific output throughout decades, and articles devoted
to it often warned the reader in their titles of the hypothetical
character with the words “The cerebellum and the physics
of movement, some speculations”, and “Intricacies of motor
control. An essay”. Despite his emphasis on the word ‘specu-
lation’, this should be taken as a sign of humility, for many of
his insights are logical consequences of premises well estab-
lished in fact.
Braitenberg’s article “Intricacies of movement control”
departs from a taxonomy of animal movement, that surveys
the phenomenology of motion generation, from the undula-
tory movement of worms to the subtle and sensitive touch.
Thereafter, he indulges in inventing a machine for motion
control, which bears a remarkable resemblance with the cer-
ebellum.
I would like to quote the introduction to that paper in its
entirety (the whole paper is quotation worthy material):
The synthetic approach of robotics and the analytic
approach of motor physiology have not yet reached
much common ground. To be sure, some ideas first
formulated in engineering have entered the vocabulary
of the physiologists (e.g., position feedback, bang-bang
control, stability, frames of reference) thereby making
the writings of each camp more palatable to the other.
However, the engineers still regard the biological sys-
tem as just one possible solution among many, almost
certainly not the most efficient one. Conversely to the
physiologist, the robot looks much too clumsy to be
ever taken seriously as an approximation of the real
thing.
I believe that we could come closer to each other if each
would actively invade the other’s territory, the physi-
ologist inventing machines unhampered by restraints
of technical feasibility, and the engineer explaining the
brain in ignorance of the (indeed scanty) physiological
evidence. I will do a bit of both, putting myself in the
role of both kinds of trespassers, combining so to say
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two kinds of ignorance in the hope of achieving some
fruitful synthesis.
“Inventing the cerebellum” (section 3 of Braitenberg
1993) is a study in reverse engineering, considering the kind
of tasks that an organ of movement has to solve. It departs
from a taxonomy of the kinds of movements that organisms
exhibit. A theory of the cerebellum has to account for them,
as it interprets its anatomy in accordance. His list distin-
guishes types of movement that span the whole phenomenol-
ogy. Movement, broadly, is a change of the position of parts of
the animal relative to each other. It is to be distinguished from
locomotion, when the position of the animal changes relative
to external coordinates. Movements are further categorized in
deformations of the body, and movement against an external
force. Deformations contain the categories of symmetrical
(as extending limbs simultaneously), or asymmetrical (with
respect to the center of gravity), such as moving a leg or an
arm at a time. Rotation is an example of an asymmetrical
movement, of which there are multiple kinds: rotation of a
limb with respect to the body, or flexion and extension, such
that the angular momentum cancels each other (anti-symmet-
rical). Another kind of asymmetrical deformations is given
by swinging an appendage on its hinge, which produces a
rotation of the bulk of the body (fly wheel motion of the cat).
In oscillation, opposing forms are mostly internal. Turning
to deformations against external forces, we have posture in
which the whole body stands against gravity, and pendular
in which appendages have to oppose it. Pushing and Pulling,
happen when two bodies are involved, or when locomoting
(pushing against friction). In addition, Jumping and Throw-
ing, when the contact between agent and object is interrupted,
and Touching and Holding, where the forces are given by the
elastic deformation of tissue.
These problems are general problems of movement, of
which most are associated, in vertebrates, with cerebellar
function. These are the explananda. On the basis of the phys-
ical requirements for movement, and interpreting anatomical
features, Braitenberg proceeds to ‘invent a cerebellum’. “My
plea is for the simples possible principles of mechanics to
be invoked in the explanation of movement since the motor
system, in order to be efficient and economical, cannot but
conform to such principles”. His desiderata for a contraption
that would potentially solve the problems of movement are
enlisted in the end of the article. It seems appropriate to put
them in bullets. If he were inventing a control system for
movement, he would have it in this fashion:
Two main tasks are to be distinguished, and assign one
mechanism for each. One mechanism for Action, deliberate
movements of the body that change the state of the world to
conform to a desired picture. The other is stability mecha-
nism, whose role is to maintain the body stability by com-
pensating for the physics of the body. The stability machine
would perform two kinds of translations of internal states,
efferent and afferent. Efferent states translate the states of the
internal elements into signals to the muscles which activate
them exactly to the degree that corresponds to theirs state of
contraction in the internal representation. Afferent states will
signal deviations from the internal representations and can
then be used to assess external forces that are in the way of the
motor realization. In this view, the position of the body is an
automatic consequence of ‘thinking’ that position. (as in the
proposition of equilibrium point control by Feldman (1986)
and Bizze et al. (1982)). The computer of stability could in
principle be informed about every transition planned by the
cognitive machine. Incorporating knowledge of the laws of
mechanics and of the quantities involved (mass shape elas-
ticity, viscosity), it could in principle compute all the devia-
tions from the planned action and produce the corrections in
real time. The stability machine would have implicit repre-
sentations of the variables of movement, for explicit repre-
sentations would be verbose and cumbersome. “Since many
different situations have to dealt with for which there is no
common solution, I would compartmentalize my machine.
The stability machine does has sequences as input and must
associate to each particular output sequence. My machine
would work in the ’sequence in sequence out’ mode.” Sig-
nals would come in different combinations and at different
locations (signifying different phases), and therewith diverse
combinations of motor ensembles. Outputs would be com-
bined with appropriate delays to activate the motor elements.
A guided learning process to transform angular and over-
shooting movement into elegant and precise movements, by
selecting well-timed action. The machine should save the
organism’s energy, by avoiding unnecessary action, while
being responsive to urgent action.
Humorously, Braitenberg proceeds to point out that the
machine he has been inventing has many features in com-
mon with the cerebellum, by assigning roles to the nota-
ble cerebellar components: its elongated compartments of
parallel fibers, the individuality of compartments conferred
by the baskets, and stellate interneurons arranged at right
angles. That a large part of the cerebellar input comes from
the cortex ‘the cognitive machine’ via the pontine nuclei (and
now we know, also through the basal ganglia). Purkinje cells
receive connections from the parallel fibers from a multitude
of synapses, in accordance with the learning requirement.
And finally, the output is inhibitory, in agreement with an
energy saving principle.
To the extent that many of these insights have now uncon-
sciously made their way into the cerebellar field, the rich
and coherent picture Braitenberg painted through his career
is foundational, but strangely unacknowledged. Although
these collected thoughts appear in the 1986 article, many
of these views were present even in his seminal 1958 arti-
cle, and many subsequent ones in which he more fully
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developed quantitative and relational theories of the prin-
ciples involved.
4.6.1 Cerebellar necessities
It is perhaps not a mystery that his life-long interest dwelt
in the interpretation of the cerebellum. In ‘83, he wrote “25
years ago I thought that the cerebellum was the part of the
brain most likely to be understood by direct translation of
the anatomy into functional terms. Today I am still confident,
even if the schemes proposed in the meantime have proved to
cover at best only very partial aspects of cerebellar function
and sometimes quite divorced from any realistic consider-
ation of histology” (Braitenberg 1983). Devotedly, he honed
his explanations and interpretations of the cerebellum, inte-
grating new thoughts and new results as they came into a
framework.
And despite the often heard trite dismissal of the cerebel-
lum being merely the organ of motion (as if this would mean
it’s uninteresting!), we still lack a theory that satisfies both
histology and motor behavior. The case may still prove to be
that Braitenberg’s explanations will be a component of the
successful ones to come. That the cerebellum is the organ of
sequencing, that parallel fibers will still turn out to act more or
less as delay lines, and that compartments will stand for spa-
tial temporal transformations of specific muscle groups are
still tenable hypotheses, notwithstanding the vociferous crit-
icism often received, as Braitenberg’s flights of fancy were
firmly grounded on knowledge of fluid mechanics.
In his words “I am reluctant to give up an idea on neural
computation which has the rare merit of providing detailed
explanations of many morphological peculiarities in a piece
of grey substance”. Rightfully so, as his consistency afforded
him a sophisticated system of understanding, perhaps one of
the most distinguishing features of his work. Whether his
hypotheses are verified remains to be shown, but whatever
the case, the shape of an explanation will have to abide to his
observations bearing on necessities. One of the core neces-
sities is that the outside, the world, and the inside, the brain,
must meet.
5 Conclusion: inside out and outside in meet
Let us indulge, and imagine for a second that we at present
already possess all the knowledge about the brain that would
allow us to explain it, as in Hofstadter’s words, ‘in a lan-
guage we ourselves can fathom’. Let us attempt to explain it
from first principles, undisturbed by the fact that we do not
possess sufficient knowledge. A priori, an understanding of
the organismic function of the brain includes two directions,
outside in and inside out. Outside-in is from behavioral func-
tion to its neural correlates. The outside includes that what we
can observe organisms performing, includes how the world
makes it into ourselves, the constraints of physics, and the
regularities of interaction between world and organism. The
inside-out begins in neuroanatomy and neuronal dynamics
and goes through how the brain and the body are rigged for
the interaction. To be satisfactory the two directions must
meet, regardless of the lack of a well-defined middle.
To be sure, we do not currently possess sufficient knowl-
edge (dissatisfaction is a human characteristic). However,
whatever the case with regard to completeness, we can boast
some knowledge that would definitely have impressed our
noble ancestry. Whatever findings the future might uncover,
there are some definite boundary conditions that any expla-
nation will have to meet—boundary conditions known now,
indeed, some of them with considerable certainty. Those
pieces of knowledge were the kind from which Braitenberg’s
proposals germinated.
Starting at one end, say for example, neuroanatomy (the
“in”), we will not get very far in our explanations if we do
not exit at the other side, the world (the“out”). Conversely,
starting from the world, we must find out about the regulari-
ties of the world that will indisputably determine the physical
modes of interaction available, as we and the world, essen-
tially, are made of the same matter, and abide to the same
laws. The regularities in interaction between ourselves and
the world are determined by our construction, which in turn
are determined by the stuff of which the world is made. We
are the world. And so to know about ourselves, we also need
to know the world.
So much for my attempt to subsume Braitenberg’s func-
tional philosophy, which in the present incarnation answers
as embodied cognition. But rather than constraining his
thoughts to a label, I will reinstate his belief that the reg-
ularities in interaction between cognitive systems and the
world are determined by physical laws. And that we oper-
ate by and large by the same physical laws (Negrello 2011;
Merleau-Ponty 1963).
Braitenberg was keenly aware of the two complementary
directions, and while being formally trained only in one, as
a neuroanatomist, had a grasp of mechanics such as to leave
an engineer humbled. It was often between the two extremes
where he found the tools that would allow him to frame,
describe, and quantify behavioral phenomena. He dwelt in
a world of cell counts, fiber tracts, efferent and afferent pat-
terns. But he transcended the data, commuting between levels
to tie up both ends of explanation.
It is not incidental that Braitenberg was a burgeoning
neuroanatomist in the heyday of cybernetics, which left an
indelible mark on his thought. Back in the day, cybernet-
ics had not yet acquired the somewhat mixed reputation it
may unfairly carry today. In those days, when Reichardt pro-
posed his model of motion detection, when feedback con-
trol was emphasized by Wiener, and Von Holst, Mittelstaedt
ushered the environmental loop, the world saw the inception
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of the Rosenblatt’s perceptron and the McCullogh-Pitts neu-
ron, Hebb argued cell assemblies, David Marr’s outlined his
theory of vision, Marvin Minsky, McCarthy, Lashley, Von
Foerster, and many others were advancing artificial intelli-
gence, brain theory was teeming with mechanistic insight.
Looking back, it is surprising that their explanatory power
have often been relegated to the domains of robotics, com-
puter vision, and artificial intelligence. As such, Braiten-
berg’s endeavors appear as a hallmark of his times. But from
all his peers he was in the forefront, pushing the boundaries
of knowledge, while encouraging his peers to think about
the actual brain. And indeed, he often jovially defended the
brain, in paragraphs not devoid of sarcasm, when his con-
temporaries seemed to neglect the grey matter from which
their abstractions arose.
Braitenberg started from both ends, neuroanatomy and
behavioral function, and hazarded to connect them. His arti-
cles often begin with a broad view of the theme, swiftly pro-
ceeding to systematically indicating peculiarities of the sub-
ject, pointing out necessities, invariances, idiosyncrasies and
the remarkable. It was only after a clear disposition of the
distinguished features of the system that he attempted to tie
loose ends with function. Because,
[…] We will not be able, in most cases, to explain the
peculiarities of a certain brain structure by invoking the
rules and constraints of the mechanism that synthesize
brains out of neurons, but will always have to con-
sider explanations in terms of the function it performs.
(Braitenberg 1977)
His articles often end abruptly, as if leaving space for the
reader to fill in the gaps.
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